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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case in good time before 1 November 1993 and again before 15 December 1993, a report on the situation in Angola and the implementation of that resolution, with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments. Since the adoption of the resolution, the Council has been kept regularly informed of developments in Angola at its informal consultations.

2. In this connection, on 24 September 1993, the President of the Security Council issued a statement to the press which, inter alia, reaffirmed the provisions of resolution 864 (1993). In the statement, the Council insisted that the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fully respect and abide by the Bicesse Accords and that the Government and UNITA make every effort to resume the negotiations. The Council also stressed that, unless an effective cease-fire came into force and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant Security Council resolutions were undertaken, the mandatory sanctions envisaged in resolution 864 (1993) would be applied as of midnight, 25 September 1993, with additional measures to be considered if there was still no progress to that end by 1 November 1993.

3. The present report covers the period from 15 September to 26 October 1993.

I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

4. Since my last report to the Security Council dated 13 September 1993 (S/26434), the United Nations has continued its efforts to facilitate the resumption of the peace process in consultation with the Angolan parties and interested countries, including, in particular, the observer countries to the Bicesse Accords (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America). These efforts were intensified following the adoption of Security Council resolution 864 (1993) on 15 September 1993. I have also exchanged views with

President José Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Jonas Savimbi as well as with senior officials on the pressing need to resume negotiations. I and my Special Representative have also held separate discussions with the representatives of the three observer States.

5. Since the bombing of Huambo resumed on 2 August 1993, the only contact my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, has been able to maintain with Mr. Savimbi was through telephone and telefax. However, on 14 and 15 September 1993, Mr. Beye met with a high-level UNITA delegation in Abidjan. On 24 September 1993, a UNAVEM II delegation headed by the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Chris Garuba, met with senior UNITA military officials in Sao Tomé to discuss the practical modalities related to UNITA's unilaterally declared cease-fire. The following day, 25 September, the Chief Military Observer and representatives of the observer States held similar consultations with the Government in Luanda.

6. In his contacts with the Government and UNITA, my Special Representative has persistently emphasized, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993), the urgent need for the earliest possible resumption of peace talks under United Nations auspices. Both the Government and UNITA have reiterated to my Special Representative their readiness to cooperate with the United Nations effort to expedite the peace process. My Special Representative, in close cooperation with the representatives of the three observer States, continued his efforts to narrow the differences in the positions of the Government and UNITA, within the framework of UNAVEM II's mandate of good offices and mediation.

7. UNITA's proposals of 12 September 1993, officially handed to my Special Representative on 14 September, included a "unilateral declaration of a cease-fire <u>in situ</u> throughout the Angolan national territory" to come into effect on 20 September and also called for immediate discussions on the following political and military issues:

(a) Formation of a national army;

(b) Formation of a police force at the national, provincial and local levels;

(c) Decentralization of administration;

(d) Creation of conditions guaranteeing freedom of expression and association;

(e) Creation of conditions for a democratic social communication.

8. My Special Representative presented his observations on the above proposals to the UNITA delegation he met with in Abidjan on 14 and 15 September 1993. In particular, he drew attention to the fact that the plan did not make reference to the legal framework for the peace process, namely the Bicesse Accords, acceptance of the results of the elections of September 1992, the understandings reached at Abidjan and relevant Security Council resolutions and to the fact that UNITA's statement was a unilateral declaration of a cessation of hostilities rather than a cease-fire, which would require a bilateral agreement

between the parties. In my Special Representative's view, the conclusion of a bilateral cease-fire agreement should have been the first point included in UNITA's proposals for negotiations.

9. The Government, in its peace plan of 22 September 1993 (S/26492), expressed the view that the resolution of the post-electoral crisis should be based on the following principles, and reiterated its willingness to resume negotiations once they had been established:

(a) UNITA's military forces should be withdrawn from territories that were illegally occupied after the multiparty elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992. That action should be followed by a cease-fire under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

(b) Unimpeded access for humanitarian aid and immediate evacuation of the wounded, the sick and foreigners after the cease-fire must take place;

(c) There must be complete and unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the Bicesse Accords and the results of the elections held in September 1992;

(d) There must be respect for the legislation produced by the instruments of sovereignty constituted as a result of the elections.

10. My Special Representative continued to make every effort to overcome the obstacles to the peace process that have so far impeded the resumption of negotiations between the Government and UNITA. He called on UNITA to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to a peaceful solution and, to that end, to reaffirm its adherence to the legal framework for the implementation of the peace process. Similar appeals were also made to UNITA to accept formally the legal framework by several Heads of State in the region.

11. In the communiqué issued at the end of the extraordinary meeting of its Political Commission held in Huambo from 28 September to 6 October 1993, UNITA made reference to the legal framework by stating that it:

(a) Reaffirmed the "validity of the Bicesse Accords as the basis of the peace process but believes they should be updated";

(b) Reiterated "its acceptance of the results of the elections of 29 and 30 September 1992 although it considers them as fraudulent";

(c) Considered "the Abidjan Protocol as a serious basis for negotiations between the Government and UNITA";

(d) "Took note of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and reiterated its readiness to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Angola, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, in the search for a real and lasting solution to the Angolan conflict".

12. The UNITA communiqué also mentioned that:

(a) The institutions resulting from the elections should reflect the current position of UNITA and of the other forces of the opposition;

(b) Respect for human rights should be guaranteed to the Angolan people with a particular emphasis on the right to life;

(c) The United Nations should deploy efforts to bring the parties together in order to obtain a global and effective cease-fire;

(d) UNITA would maintain the unilateral cease-fire declared on 20 September 1993 and would request its verification by United Nations observers;

(e) Humanitarian aid should be delivered to the needy population without discrimination;

(f) Recourse to summits was laudable in itself, but past experience showed that it did not resolve complex conflict situations, such as the Angolan one;

(g) The UNITA Armed Forces fully supported the early resumption of negotiations between the Government and UNITA and requested the Special Representative to announce the date.

13. My Special Representative welcomed UNITA's decision to maintain its unilaterally declared cease-fire, its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and of the results of the elections, as well as its reference to the draft Abidjan Protocol as a firm basis for negotiations. Nevertheless, he underlined the need for UNITA to clarify its position on several important aspects, including the resolutions of the Security Council.

14. Following my Special Representative's transmission of the UNITA communiqué to the Government of Angola on 8 October 1993, the Government expressed its concerns over what it considered as the "ambiguities and contradictions" contained in that document. The Government therefore requested my Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States to meet with UNITA in order to clarify these points.

15. The United Nations has attempted to engage all sectors of Angolan society in its efforts to promote national reconciliation. To this end, my Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II have maintained close contacts with representatives of political parties, parliamentarians, religious leaders, academic communities, the media and military officials in Angola. My Special Representative has also maintained close contacts with the diplomatic corps in Luanda in recognition of the important role the international community plays in efforts aimed at consolidating the peace process.

16. On the military front, information received from the UNAVEM II teams deployed in five areas in the country, as well as from Government and UNITA sources, indicates a general decrease in the intensity of military operations since 21 September 1993. However, contradictory information on specific military activities in various parts of the country has been reported by both the Government and the UNITA-controlled media. Government sources have reported UNITA troop and logistic build-up in the provinces of Bengo, Huila, Cuando Cubango, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Sul and Moxico, and UNITA troop movements around the cities of Kuito/Bié, Menongue, Luena, Saurimo and others. The same sources have

reported UNITA attacks and ambushes in several parts of the country, including the resumed shelling of Menongue, since 2 October 1993. The government media have also claimed that the oil and arms embargo imposed against UNITA has been violated and that UNITA has continued to receive shipments of military matériel and other assistance through a number of air and sea ports in the country. On its part, UNITA's Radio Vorgan has not broadcast much military information during the period under review, but has reported government bombardment of the city of Huambo and of parts of Malange Province, reports which have, on several occasions, been repeated to my Special Representative by UNITA officials.

17. The ability of UNAVEM II effectively to verify the military situation following UNITA's declaration of a unilateral cease-fire on 20 September 1993 is limited by the fact that the Mission's current military observer force of some 50 military and 18 police officers cannot assure nationwide coverage of Angola's large territory. At the same time, the Government and UNITA have not agreed to extend to UNAVEM II unconditional safety and security guarantees in the combat zones which is an absolute necessity for the deployment of military and police observers across the country.

II. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

18. Since my last report to the Council on 13 September 1993 (S/26434), United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expanded their programme of humanitarian assistance in Angola, both in quantity and in scope. Reports from United Nations agencies and NGOs indicate that the size of the affected and displaced population is considerably higher than the 1.9 million persons stated in the June 1993 appeal; the reliable estimate is now 3 million. After weeks of difficult negotiations by my Special Representative to achieve free access to the worst affected areas, the United Nations system, working with NGOs, has significantly increased the rate of delivery of relief aid over land and by air to reach all parts of Angola.

19. The past months have seen an intensification of misery across the country. The combination of war, famine, displacement and siege produced visible and lethal pockets of vulnerability, replete with severe malnutrition, diarrhoea and other preventable diseases. My Special Representative visited Malange in early October 1993 with the heads of United Nations agencies, where health authorities reported as many as 125 child deaths per day in nutritional centres. Missions from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to the isolated town of Menongue in late September 1993 observed shocking malnutrition and a total absence of food stocks. United Nations agencies and NGOs have tracked recent movements of populations in grave physical condition, as civilians seek refuge away from the principal sites of warfare. The populations of major towns, including Benguela, Malange, Luena and Menongue, have swollen with the influx from the surrounding rural areas. Luanda itself has mushroomed, with the concomitant urban ills associated with human displacement; increased delinquency, violence and epidemics. In July 1993, my Special Representative announced that the Angolan emergency caused 1,000 deaths each day. This figure is now recognized to be a conservative estimate.

20. WFP, which is responsible for emergency logistical operations, nearly doubled its overall deliveries between July and September. The bulk of food deliveries has been carried overland from ports to those provinces along or adjacent to the coast. The monthly pace of convoys increased from 6,386 tons in July to over 8,800 in September. NGOs have shown tremendous dedication in the past months, expanding their distribution activities into previously unreachable areas of the interior. The nutritional situation in this region is no longer deteriorating, although the population remains fragile. In those areas where access was denied until 14 October, however, the humanitarian situation is grave. Rapid assessments took place in Huambo and Cuito, and were followed immediately by airlifts of food and medical assistance. Conditions in Malange and Menongue have sufficiently stabilized to permit the continuous airlift of relief supplies to these two towns. The combined efforts of WFP and one NGO have flown a total of 4,274 tons of food aid to 8 of the 13 conflict areas, over half of this in the last 4 weeks. There is still a measurable imbalance in the quantities of aid going to each side, but increased flexibility in flight authorizations from the Government and UNITA is permitting greater access to both sides.

21. In September, UNICEF initiated its second 90-day plan, providing aid in primary health care, vaccination and diarrhoeal disease control, nutrition, relief and survival assistance, household food security, water and sanitation and education. The current agricultural campaign constitutes a key priority in the area of non-food aid. The Government has increased the areas under its control, and conditions permit expanded planting in some areas. Under the leadership of my Special Representative, and with assistance from the humanitarian assistance coordination unit, United Nations agencies and NGOs are working with the Government to plan the delivery of seeds and tools to permit a greater degree of self-sufficiency on the part of the affected population.

22. With regard to the continuing humanitarian emergency, major gains have been achieved in terms of accessibility. With the recent breakthroughs permitting airlifts to Kuito and Huambo, the United Nations has truly begun to reach the affected population in all parts of the country. The security of relief operations and access to those in need continue to be my two principal concerns. As the negotiations under way begin to bear fruit, strategies are now being sought to open logistical corridors reaching the isolated populations at risk. Through my Special Representative, I shall continue to promote a coordinated response involving all actors in the current Angolan context: the Government, UNITA, NGOs, United Nations agencies and the donor community. It is vital that the international community be prepared to respond rapidly, generously and with flexibility to serve new areas of humanitarian need as they become accessible.

III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

23. The Angolan crisis remains an issue of grave concern to the international community. In an effort to break the current impasse, the Security Council recently decided to resort to the measures envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter in order to compel UNITA to cease hostilities and resume dialogue with the Government, within the legal framework of the Bicesse Accords and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

24. Following extensive consultations by my Special Representative with the Angolan parties, the observer countries and the countries of the region, the Government and UNITA began exploratory talks in Lusaka, Zambia, on 25 October 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations. These talks were made possible by positive steps taken recently by both sides, including UNITA's decision to proclaim a unilateral cease-fire and its acceptance of the general legal framework as well as submission by the Government of a peace plan which reaffirmed its readiness to resume negotiations. I strongly appeal to the Government and UNITA to make full use of the present opportunity and to do their utmost to consolidate the progress made so far in order to advance the search for a lasting solution to the conflict in the country.

25. In paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993), the Security Council expressed its readiness to consider the imposition of further measures under the Charter of the United Nations against UNITA unless by 1 November 1993 the Secretary-General reported that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. I do not believe that, as of the date of the present report, enough progress has been made towards the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Council. Accordingly, I am of the view that additional measures should be imposed against UNITA. However, in view of the fact that the political talks under my Special Representative's chairmanship have recently started in Lusaka and are still in progress, I would recommend that action to impose further measures be postponed by a period of one month, i.e. until 1 December 1993.

26. On numerous occasions, the Security Council has reiterated its readiness to consider taking prompt action to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event that significant progress in the peace process was achieved. In the present atmosphere of cautious optimism and hope, I feel that the United Nations should be prepared to respond rapidly and decisively to consolidate any progress that might be achieved in coming days. As a first step, it might consider the Mission's requirements for verifying the military situation on the ground by augmenting the existing strength of the military and police components of UNAVEM II. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it authorize an increase of UNAVEM II military observers from the current level of 50 to 175, that of police observers from 18 to 60, and that of military paramedics to 14 (from the presently mandated number of 11). These military personnel, with the appropriate transport and communications resources, would be deployed in the event of a breakthrough. They would enhance the Mission's ability to verify major developments on the ground and to provide good offices. UNAVEM would increase the number of its outstations throughout the country and the number and scope of its patrols, and would also form a number of rapid verification teams. With the agreement of the Government and UNITA, some of the military and police observers would be placed in zones of former intensive combat. My Special Representative will accordingly seek all necessary guarantees for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in such areas. A corresponding increase in administrative personnel and material resources would be necessary. In particular, an additional 21 international and 37 local staff would be required. The financial implications of these immediate requirements will be reflected in an addendum to the present report.

27. Subsequently, depending on the observance of an effective cease-fire throughout the country, the strength of UNAVEM II's military and police components might have to be rapidly brought to its originally mandated level of 350 military observers and 126 police observers. In addition, the numerous tasks that the United Nations may be called upon to perform in accordance with the draft Abidjan Protocol would require a substantial presence of United Nations formed units. I intend to proceed with the necessary contingency planning in this regard, to enable the United Nations to be in a position to respond at short notice and to make an appropriate contribution to the implementation of a comprehensive settlement. I will revert to the Council in due course with specific recommendations regarding the level and modalities of the contribution that the United Nations could make.

28. With regard to the humanitarian emergency, our goal continues to be to reach all in need of such assistance throughout the country. As greater access is assured, there is a concomitant need to respond rapidly to meet increased requirements. With the recent expansion of humanitarian activity, the problem of adequate stocks of relief supplies has come to the fore. This is a challenge that calls for a coordinated response from the international community. In addition, the continued cooperation of the Government and UNITA is vital for the success of this humanitarian endeavour. I would like to reiterate my deep appreciation to the international community for the assistance provided so far and to appeal once more for further generous support to meet the growing needs. I would also like to commend the many men and women who are taking part, under extremely difficult circumstances, in the humanitarian relief efforts in Angola for their dedication and courage. I should also like to express my appreciation for the dedicated efforts of my Special Representative to restart the humanitarian relief distribution programme as well as for his perseverance, which has led to the convening of the important talks currently under way in Lusaka.